Why the Housing Stimulus and FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
loan guarantees put Taxpayers (and the economy) at Risk
Buyers, builders, realtors and mortgage
companies may love the homebuyer tax credit, but it's just another taxpayer bailout.
HOT: The housing market is sick, but the
homebuyer tax credit passed by Congress will only extend the healing process and line the pockets of the
building, real estate and mortgage industries. FHA loan guarantees that promote homeownership with little money
down also puts taxpayers at risk. Together, they could worsen the economic recession if unemployment falls and
foreclosures increase, asDeutsche Bank predicts. HOT now views the FHA as
the new AIG and opposes extending the $8,000 tax credit and instead encourages tighter controls and
regulatory oversight. See why we opposed the Homebuyer Tax
Credit.
THE
LATEST:The homebuyer tax credit
expired at the end of April. As Congress considers financial industry reforms, it must look at housing
financing and possible reforms of the homebuilding industry too because, HOT contends, big
vertically-integrated builders taught Wall Street the art of predatory lending in the first
place.
What’s Next for Fannie and
Freddie?
In his 5/24/10 blog, Wall Street Journal reporter Nick Timiraos examines the challenge of reforming
Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac. He addresses several questions and then asks for reader suggestions. HOT responds
as JustLaws.
1. Why doesn’t the financial-overhaul bill address Fannie and
Freddie? "... Revamping the housing-finance giants, which own or guarantee around half of the nation’s $10.3 trillion in
home mortgages, was never going to be easy. But the fact that, together with the Federal Housing
Administration, the companies guaranteed 96.5% of all new
mortgages last quarter has made the challenge only greater. ..."
2. Why are Fannie and Freddie still losing
money? "The companies have
taken $145 billion in handouts, including $19 billion this quarter,
from the U.S. Treasury so far, and that number could rise as foreclosures mount. Each quarter, as more mortgages go
delinquent, Fannie and Freddie have to set aside more cash in reserve to cover losses if those loans end up
defaulting and the homes they’re secured by go through foreclosure. ..."
3. Why is the government still putting money
into the companies? "... In February 2009, the Obama administration said it would double to $200 billion the amount of aid it was
willing to put into each of the two firms. Then in December, it said it would waive those limits, and allow for
unlimited sums over the next three years.
..."
4. What would the mortgage market look like
today without government support? "... Mike Farrell, chief executive of Annaly Capital Management, estimates that mortgage rates today would be
two to three percentage points higher without government
guarantees."
5. What will ultimately happen to Fannie and
Freddie? "Congress has to decide what it wants the housing-finance system of the future to do. 'Everyone acknowledges that the model is broken, that the model was flawed, yet we
don’t know how to run a mortgage market without them and we have nothing with which to replace the broken
system,' says Howard Glaser, a Clinton administration housing official and housing-industry consultant.
..."
HOT
COMMENT (personal opinion as JustLaws rather than official HOT response):
Housing and the mortgage meltdown were
market failures in a “free market” economy where special
interest legislation created artificial stimulus that benefited some at the expense of others.
For the free market to succeed and to restore a healthy housing
market, we need to remove the artificial stimulus promoting “The American Dream” of affordable
homeownership. We must replace short-term speculation with
long-term investments, not just in housing but in Wall Street stock transactions
too.
Without “flippers” and real estate speculators or
policies pushing homeownership to people better off renting, we would not have had a bubble of oversupply,
inflated prices, and predatory lending. On the Wall Street side, imagine if shareholders held CEOs accountable
for sustainable, long-term growth rather than quarterly returns. They too would change decision making, and
we’d likely see less downsizing and outsourcing, less churn in employment, more emphasis on retraining, and
more government investment in education, infrastructure, and scientific research to return our nation to tech
leadership. Now how do we get there?
Repeal Glass-Steagall. Require lenders to keep at
least 20% of each loan on their books. Require a down payment of at least 20% for federally insured loans.
Eliminate mortgage interest tax deductions and homebuyer tax credits. Reign in the housing special interests by
regulating the homebuilding industry, which includes vertically-integrated builders with their own mortgage
companies. These unregulated builders taught the banks and mortgage companies the art of predatory lending. See
“Texas Homebuilding and the Global Collapse” (http://www.homeownersoftexas.org/collapse.pdf).
And here’s the biggie… charge a 5% sales tax on
each home sale and stock transaction. People needing homes would still buy, or rent if that made more sense.
Landlords would still invest in homes. Speculation would be expensive and discouraged.
Fannie Mae needs ANOTHER $8.4 Billion!
In this 5/11 Wall Street Journal video (http://bit.ly/cfFIwf), Nick Timiraos reports that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and FHA now comprise
96.5% of the U.S. mortgage market.
Fannie "has now racked up losses of nearly $145 billion, or nearly double its
profits for the previous 35 years. While many of the nation's biggest banks have repaid their government loans and
some are back to racking up big profits, Fannie and Freddie are still suffering from the housing-market
crisis."
Homebuyers are rushing to take advantage of federal tax credits - due to
expire at midnight tonight - of up to $8,000 for first-time purchasers and as much as $6,500 for some
current homeowners. Real estate agents called the program a success, and many are expecting the incentive to give
the market a boost this spring. But some tax experts criticize it as a
giveaway to people who would have bought anyway.
The credit for first-time buyers is thought to have played a considerable role in stimulating home sales this
spring. Sales of new homes surged 27 percent last month from a record low a month earlier; it was the biggest
monthly increase in 47 years. Sales of previously occupied homes, meanwhile, were up nearly 7 percent in March and
are expected to keep climbing.
After the tax credit is gone, however, the surge could prove
short-lived. Many analysts project sales will drop sharply in the second half of the year. Some expect prices to
plunge as well, especially if mortgage rates rise and a wave of foreclosed homes hits the market.
Congress included the temporary tax credit in the $787 billion stimulus package signed into law a month after
President Barack Obama took office last year. The idea was to bring the housing market back to life. Lawmakers,
after intense lobbying from the real estate industry, agreed last
fall to extend it until April 30.
Nearly 1.8 million households had used the credit as of mid-February at a cost of $12.6 billion, according to
the Internal Revenue Service.
The homebuyer tax credit has been one of a number of government stimulus programs that seem to be helping the
housing market regain its footing after the worst downturn since the Great Depression. Other measures have included
the Obama administration's $75 billion foreclosure prevention plan, the Federal Reserve's $1.25 trillion program to
drive down mortgage rates, and about $126 billion in taxpayer spending to stabilize mortgage finance companies
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Skeptics say that these measures are an attempt to manipulate market
forces and that they are leaving housing vulnerable to an economic double dip, meaning a recurrence of the recent
downturn. Although the number of new foreclosures has come down a bit, nearly 7.4 million borrowers, or
12 percent of all households with a mortgage, had missed payments or were in foreclosure as of March, according to
Lender Processing Services Inc.
Some economists say the main effect of the first-time buyer tax credit
was to bring would-be homeowners into the market sooner.
"Most of the benefits went to people who would have bought a home anyway," said Patrick Newport,
an economist at IHS Global Insight. He estimates that the tax credits will spark only 350,000 to 450,000 additional
sales for 2009 and 2010 combined.
In Houston, transit mechanic Stan Henderson, 51, is buying his first home, a three-bedroom, $104,995 house from
builder KB Home that is still under construction. Affordable prices and low mortgage rates were part of the draw,
he said, but the tax credit "was the straw that stirred the drink."
Material from The Associated Press and the Los Angeles Times.
Timothy Geithner, a man whose taste for Kierkegaard
is usually kept under wraps, recently held forth to the House Financial Services Committee on
the “central, existential question” that is facing America or, at the very least, that is facing its
reform of housing finance. The Treasury secretary is bedeviled over
what to do with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bailed-out mortgage
giants that have cost the taxpayers upward of $125 billion with as yet no end in sight. Shutting them
down is not so easy because - get ready for this - since their bailout, in September 2008, Fannie and Freddie
have become more, not less, important to the U.S. housing market. At
present, 9 of every 10 new mortgages are sold to, or guaranteed by, arms of the U.S. government, the majority
of them to Fannie and Freddie. Which is to say, without Uncle Sam, it is not clear that the private
market for housing would even exist.
But retaining Fannie and Freddie in their present
form is unpalatable; government support of the mortgage twins was among the original sins of the financial crisis.
It stemmed from the country’s affection for homeownership - a legacy of a frontier nation that subsidized
homesteading for pioneers and encouraged later generations to homestead in the suburbs via the mortgage-interest
deduction. Renting was disfavored; federal policy encouraged ownership. But the policy was wrapped around the
fiction that federal support promoted self-reliance rather than dependence.
Fannie and Freddie developed as tools of credit
enhancement; direct handouts offended laissez-faire sensibilities, whereas loan guarantees were nearly invisible.
The practice of disguising government aid dates to the rescue of farmers and homeowners during the Depression.
Mortgage capital barely existed and so, in 1934, the New Deal chartered the
Federal Housing Administration to stimulate mortgage lending. Within a generation, the government was
operating 74 separate programs to bolster credit through guarantees, insurance or outright loans, according to
Sarah Quinn, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, who researched these
programs. The point, Quinn says, was nearly always the same: “to camouflage, hide, or understate the extent to
which [the U.S. government] actually intervened in the economy.”
No organizations epitomized the charade so well as
Fannie and Freddie. Fannie was created in 1938 to purchase mortgages and allow lenders to write more loans. In the
’60s, when the mortgage industry sputtered, the Johnson administration began to use Fannie to sponsor
securitizations - that is, to guarantee pools of mortgages and sell them to investors. A House committee in 1966
saw what was, then and now, the fundamental hazard with such guarantees: to investors “it makes no difference
what the quality of these assets are.”
President Johnson was perfectly
willing to let Fannie backstop investors, but he had a problem. Every mortgage Fannie purchased went on the
government’s books, which were already strained by the Vietnam War. After valiant efforts to manipulate the budget,
Johnson hit on a solution - privatize Fannie, so that its expenditures would be somebody else’s
problem.
The clever
twist was that Fannie, which exited the public sector in 1968, wasn’t wholly separate. Investors viewed Fannie, and
its new sibling, Freddie, as having the implicit backing of the Treasury. This lowered the companies’ costs
and arguably led to lower interest rates for borrowers.
As long as Fannie and Freddie stuck to conservative
underwriting, the arrangement seemed to work. But Congress was eager to use
the twins for political purposes, like increasing homeownership and affordable housing. As Dwight
Jaffee, a professor at the Haas School of Business at Berkeley, observed, legislators persuaded themselves
that Fannie and Freddie could further such causes “basically at no cost.”
[HOT: Who
benefited from promoting homeownership? Builders and mortgage lenders clearly benefited and lobbied for the
changes, but did homeowners benefit? Really?]
When Fannie and Freddie began to face competition in
their business of securitizing loans and providing liquidity to the mortgage market, their profits and stock prices
took a nosedive. Seeking to recoup, the firms took more risk. And thanks to
their implicit Treasury support, they could borrow virtually at will. Eventually, their debts reached the absurd
level of 100 times their capital. When mortgage values tanked, a bailout was unavoidable.
For 19 months, the pair have been wards of the state.
No one wants to repeat the experiment in irresponsibility that they represented, but officials are unlikely to yank
support as long as the mortgage market remains weak. Geithner, who is developing a plan for Fannie and Freddie, has
promised that “private gains will no longer be subsidized by public
losses,” but he also insists that “there is quite a strong economic case, a quite strong
public-policy case, for preserving and designing some form of guarantee by the government.”
Are the two agendas - private risk and public
assurance - consistent? Peter Wallison, an American Enterprise Institute scholar, fears that
Congress could opt for the path of least resistance and revive the twins as government-sponsored private firms.
Yet private companies, Wallison says, cannot perform a public mission, which the twins’ recent history would seem
to confirm. If homeownership was the goal, securitization barely made a dent. In 1980, 64 percent of Americans
owned their homes; three decades later, the rate is 67 percent. What the twins accomplished during the bubble was
to help some people who could not afford mortgages temporarily pose as owners.
Are the firms
really so indispensable? Unlike during the Depression, a private market for mortgages does exist (albeit, it
is dormant now). The government might consider making a calculated exit. A strategy proposed by Jaffee is for
Fannie and Freddie to gradually raise the fees they charge for guaranteeing the value of mortgage securities. At
some point, private companies would be able to securitize mortgages for less, and the business would shift to the
private sector. Functions the market will not support (like helping affordable housing) are best transferred to the
government, financed on-budget.
America may want a private mortgage market, or it
might want the security of a subsidized market. What every administration since L.B.J.’s has coveted and what has
always been a lie is that we can get a subsidized market free.
Has the FHA become the new AIG? Who will regulate
it? Like AIG, the FHA insures loans to people who
can't always make their payments. By September 2009 FHAinsured nearly 40% of all new home mortgages. That's up from about 9% in late
August 2009 and amounts to nearly $750 billion. About 14% of them are now past due, and because FHA
cash reserves are already so thin, they may need their own bailout.
Between the FHA, VA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, taxpayers now
guarantee some 80% of all U.S. home mortgages, many made with nothing down and no accountability.
That seems to make the government complicit in encouraging risky loans and bad business
practices.
Federal housing officials served subpoenas Tuesday on 15 mortgage companies, including one in Lakeway, that
had suspiciously high default rates for loans backed by the Federal Housing Administration. The actions are part of
a broad crackdown on dubious lenders as the agency tries to
stem losses.
After the housing market went bust, the FHA became the major source of
funding for first-time homebuyers. But the agency, which insures about 30 percent of new loans, has seen its losses
rise dramatically. Although the agency has avoided a taxpayer rescue so far, its reserves have sunk
below the minimum level required by Congress.
There also have been fears that subprime lenders have shifted their business to the FHA after the subprime
business went bust.
The agency has already taken action against several problem lenders. One of the nation's biggest mortgage
bankers, Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Co. of Ocala, Fla., was banned from the FHA program in August and
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Another mortgage company, Lend America, was kicked out in November.
On Tuesday, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's inspector general, Kenneth Donohue, said he wanted
to determine why defaults are so high among the 15 companies and whether any have committed fraud.
"Many of these target loans didn't last but a short time before defaulting," Donohue said. "We
will conduct an investigation, if appropriate, to determine who is responsible and will recommend that appropriate
action be taken against individuals and corporations."
The FHA does not make loans but rather offers insurance against
default. Borrowers are willing to pay for the insurance because FHA loans require down payments of only 3.5 percent of the purchase
price.
[HOT: And USDA loans require no down payment at all. See:
"USDA offers Free money but puts
taxpayers at risk."]
The lenders targeted by FHA officials include some of its worst-performing active lenders. For example, almost
one in five loans made by Alethes LLC of Lakeway over the past two years went into default, compared with a
national average of about 5 percent.
"We are reviewing each of these files to determine what commonalities there are, if any," said
Danny Smith, president of Alethes, wrote in an e-mail. He later added that the subpoena requested "information
which has already been provided."
Two other FHA lenders being scrutinized, Alacrity Lending Co. of Southlake and Pine State Mortgage Corp. of
Atlanta, each had default rates of about 15 percent.
"We intend to comply and get as much information to them as fast as we can," said Lonnie Brantley,
chief executive of Alacrity.
The government inquiry, he said, applied to a small portion of the company's loans, and he attributed the
company's high default rate to "bad economic times."
Pine State Mortgage could not be immediately reached for comment, and the company's Web site was down Tuesday
afternoon.
The largest lender under the FHA's magnifying glass was First Tennessee Bank, a subsidiary of Memphis,
Tenn.-based First Horizon National Corp.
A spokesman said the company sold its mortgage division in 2008 and scaled back dramatically on new FHA loans
since then. That could be artificially inflating the company's default rate because the company is making fewer new
FHA loans.
Fannie Mae asks for another $15B in bailout
cash
Government-controlled company unveils program to avert
foreclosures
WASHINGTON - Fannie Mae asked for an
additional $15 billion in government aid after posting another big loss in the third quarter as the bill
from the housing market bust keeps rising.
Also on Thursday, Fannie Mae reached an agreement to sell about $2.6 billion in
unused low-income housing tax credits to unidentified buyers and is waiting on the Treasury Department to approve
the transaction.
Separately, Fannie Mae announced a program to give borrowers on the verge of
foreclosure the option of renting their homes for a year. At the end of last month, about 4.7 percent of Fannie
Mae's borrowers had missed at least three payments.
Troubles at the government-controlled mortgage companies Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, which were seized 14 months ago, have proved worse than most experts had foreseen. Fannie Mae's latest request would
bring the tab for rescuing both companies to about $111 billion. The government has promised up to
$400 billion in assistance.
HOT: The FHA is also in financial trouble
and may soon need a bailout of its own. Read on....
A Tale of Two Bailouts It's not the best of times for
housing.
I found it tough to get excited about the first anniversary of the Lehman
Brothers failure. That's because events in the weeks after Lehman's face-plant were more consequential,
and much, much more expensive.
Last October, first responders-the Federal Reserve,
the Treasury Department, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Congress-flooded into the financial sector. They deployed every weapon in their arsenal, and
invented some new ones, to stanch the panic: loans, subsidies, direct bailouts, free money, the
TARP. In so doing, they exposed taxpayers to massive immediate and potential liabilities. This
year's deficit is projected to be $1.58 trillion. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet has swelled from about $880
billion pre-crisis to $2.1 trillion today. Add in the stimulus and all the other measures, concludes Nomi Prins, a
former Goldman Sachs managing director and author of the bailout critique It Takes a Pillage, and the
public could be on the hook for up to $19.3 trillion.
Of course, that sum is hyperbolic, for some of the financial and
fiscal troops deployed to quell the post-Lehman panic have already been recalled, and central bankers are talking
about "exit strategies." Banks have paid back about $70 billion of the $200 billion of "investment" the government
made through the TARP's capital-purchase program. In January the taxpayers were guaranteeing some $350 billion in
commercial paper (the vehicle through which companies borrow short-term funds) under a post-Lehman program. The
balance is now down to $43 billion and falling weekly. "It appears that that market is functioning on its own,"
says Richard Bove, bank analyst at Rochdale Securities. The FDIC has proposed closing the Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program, an October 2008-vintage plan under which it guarantees debt issued by financial companies. Most
significant, on Sept. 18, the Treasury Department removed its year-old guarantee of $3.8 trillion of money-market
funds. With a single press release, it lifted a massive weight from the shoulders of taxpayers-$3.8 trillion in
dollar bills weighs about 8.7 billion pounds.
The bad news? While the
government has pacified the commercial finance, savings, and plain-vanilla banking sectors, it's sending
reinforcements into the vast, restive region where the trouble began: housing.
After Lehman, the Fed plunged directly into home lending. It pledged
to purchase huge quantities of mortgage-backed securities and bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
failed mortgage giants. "We're subsidizing housing more than
ever," says Ken Rogoff, the Harvard economist and co-author of This Time is Different, a fine
new history of financial debacles.
The Fed's portfolio of mortgage-backed securities has risen from zero
last year to $685 billion today. If they go bad, guess who
pays? And while the subprime industry may sleep with The Sopranos, there's a new subprime lender in
town: the First National Bank of You and Me. During the go-go years, the Federal Housing
Authority, the agency that helps lower-income people own homes by purchasing loans made by other
lenders, found that its 3 percent down-payment requirement was (absurdly) too stringent. And so it lost market
share. In the spring of 2006, the FHA accounted for about 9 percent of mortgages for home purchases, according
to the Mortgage Bankers Association. In late August 2009, that figure had risen to 40 percent. Like subprime lenders of old, the FHA lends to people who can't
always make their payments. In the second quarter, about 14.4 percent of the FHA's loans were at least one
month past due. And since the FHA's cash reserves are already model-thin, it may need its own
bailout.
Rogoff points out another reason we should view the glass as half
empty. Now that the government has shown the lengths it will go to save bankers from their own mistakes, they'll
have faith that it will do so again in the future. "The subsidy is now permanently in place," he says. "There's a
sense in which we're not going to be able to exit from any sector completely." To use a martial analogy, we might
declare partial victory after a surge. But we're not decommissioning the forces. We're just pulling them back over
the horizon.
Back in 2006, the news that President Bush was reading Albert Camus's
The Stranger sent policy wonks flocking to bookstores in search of existentialist works. Today, as we seek
insight into our current predicament, we might turn to another such classic: Jean-Paul Sartre's No
Exit.
The housing market is
sick, but extending the homebuyer tax credit, as proposed by the building and real estate
industries and introduced in Congress by Republican senators, will only extend the healing
process.
Never mind end-of-life care discussions
for senior citizens. We need to have one right now about the homebuyer tax credit. The powers that be need to
let this program die with dignity when its time comes rather than letting it linger. As anyone buying or selling
a home knows, the government will give you a tax credit of 10 percent of the home's purchase price up to $8,000,
provided neither you nor your spouse has owned a home in the past three years. Your new digs have to be your
primary residence for three years, and you can't make more than $75,000 a year (double that if there's two of
you).
This incentive was launched by the government earlier this year and is
set to expire Nov. 30. But if the real estate and construction industries
have their way, the program will go on life support until at least next year and perhaps indefinitely.
Several members of Congress have drafted or voiced support for bills calling for extensions or expansions of the
initiative. One version, introduced in the Senate by Georgia Republican John Isakson,
would extend the program through 2010, raise the credit to $15,000,
and be available to all homebuyers, regardless of current housing status or income level.
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd has voiced his support, as has
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. (It’s worth noting that Reid hails from Nevada, a state
that’s been especially hard hit by the real estate crisis.)
Extending the credit
and expanding its scope is a bad idea on multiple levels. For starters, let's look at the program's
return on investment. According to the IRS, 1.4 million homes have been bought since the credit's inception; the
National Association of Realtors gives a somewhat higher figure of 1.8 million to 2 million.
(Either way, the program is already going to cost about $15 billion if it winds down as planned, according to the
Associated Press.) And yet, according to the NAR’s own math, the tax credit was the make-or-break factor in only
350,000 of those sales. The National Association of Homebuilders, another industry group lobbying
to extend the credit, places this figure even lower, at 150,000. In other words, the vast majority of homebuyers
would have signed on the dotted line even without the government’s incentive.
As any marketing professional knows, you don't measure a campaign's
success by how much it costs but by how much it costs per person to persuade consumers to change their behavior. As
the observant bloggers over at Calculated Risk have pointed out, when you divide the number of
“conversions” (that is, people who bought a house only because of the tax credit) by the total amount spent on the
program, the numbers look very different. Now, instead of the program
costing $8,000 per buyer, it costs $43,000-not a great use of taxpayer dollars.
That's not the only problem. The credit also artificially inflates the value of all eligible homes sold by up to $8,000, leaving the
buyer with a debt that's greater than the value of the property. Sound familiar? Inflated home values were a
big part of what got us into this mess in the first place. Perpetuating this via the tax credit might lessen the
pain in the near term, but as we've all learned the hard way, a correction's going to come sooner or
later.
What's more, the credit creates skewed incentives. America’s tax code is already tilted heavily in favor of home
ownership; if you own your house, you get to deduct the interest you pay on your mortgage as well as your property
taxes. Plus, the more house you own, the more you can deduct. Some economists think this encourages buyers to stretch for a McMansion instead of purchasing a more modest
abode; following this logic, dropping the income cap and first-time requirement on the tax credit would only
increase that effect.
After all, there are already plenty of stimulus efforts aimed at
shoring up the housing market. On the monetary policy side, the Fed is keeping interest rates at rock-bottom levels, making it cheaper to borrow money,
including mortgages. With regard to fiscal policy, initiatives like the payroll tax cut give Americans more money in their paychecks, letting them build
a down payment faster or giving them more per month they can spend on housing.
The real estate association and its allies are right in the sense that
the tax credit did spur sales, but there's a serious asterisk after that claim. Take a look at post-Cash for
Clunkers auto sales for a recent example. Everyone who might have bought a car later this year rushed to do so
before the program expired, and the resulting hangover-dealer traffic slowed to the lowest level in nearly three
decades after it ended-isn’t pretty. Much as too many of us did with our home equity, we borrowed into the future
to pay today's bills and have nothing left now that the future has arrived.
At best, the homebuyer tax credit was a moderately effective
crutch at a time when the residential real estate market needed it most. Take that crutch away come November and
the market’s still going to limp for a while. But the alternative means prolonging that healing process and,
ultimately, recovery.
Housing Agency's Cash Reserves Will Drop Below
Requirement
The Federal Housing Administration has been hit so hard by the
mortgage crisis that for the first time, the agency's cash reserves will drop below the minimum level set by
Congress, FHA officials said.
The FHA guaranteed about a
quarter of all U.S. home loans made this year, and the reserves are meant as a financial cushion to ensure
that the agency can cover unexpected losses.
"It's very serious,"FHA Commissioner David H.
Stevens said in an interview. "There's nothing more serious that we're addressing right now, outside
the housing crisis in general, than this issue."
Until now, government officials have warned that the agency could be
forced to (1) ask Congress for billions of dollars in emergency aid or (2) charge borrowers more for taking out
FHA-insured loans if the reserves fell below the required level, equal to 2 percent of all loans guaranteed by the
agency.
Both options are politically unpalatable. Congress and the public are
weary of bailouts after the government spent hundreds of billions of dollars rescuing banks; insurance companies;
automakers; and the mortgage finance giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Raising premiums for borrowers could
increase the cost of buying a home just as a wounded housing market is showing signs of life.
Stevens said that such drastic actions are not needed. He said he is
planning to announce Friday several measures that should help the reserves rebound quickly.
The FHA, which is part of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, insures home mortgages against losses, thus helping prospective borrowers obtain loans. It uses the
insurance premiums paid by these borrowers to pay for mortgage defaults. Since its creation in 1934, it has never
used taxpayer money to cover losses at its flagship home-buying program. But rapidly rising defaults have burned
through the agency's reserves, raising the prospect that it would have to take dramatic action.
The reserves are meant to ensure that the agency remains solvent and
can continue helping people get mortgages, which in turn supports the housing market and wider economy.
An independent audit due out this fall will show that the agency's
reserves will drop below the 2 percent level as of Oct. 1, the start of the new fiscal year, Stevens
said.
Although the reserves had remained well above the minimum required
level during the housing boom, the audit last year showed they had shrunk to 3 percent as of Sept. 30, compared
with 6.4 percent a year earlier. The fund's value was estimated at $12.9 billion, down from $21.2 billion the
previous year.
'Not Going to Congress'
Earlier this year, HUD Inspector General Kenneth
Donohue told a Senate panel that falling below the reserve's minimum threshold would require an
"increase in premiums or congressional appropriation intervention to make up the shortfall."
But Stevens, who became FHA commissioner in July, said these options
are not on the table. "We are absolutely not going to Congress and
asking for money for FHA," he said. "We're not going to need a special subsidy or special funding
of any kind."
He stressed that the agency plans to take other steps that will help
beef up the reserves. Some of these measures address fraudulent loans that can contribute to FHA's
losses.
For one, he will propose that banks and other lenders that do business
with the FHA have at least $1 million in capital they can use to repay the agency for losses if they were involved
in fraud. Now, they are required only to hold $250,000. Second, he will propose that lenders also take
responsibility for any losses due to fraud committed by the mortgage brokers with whom they work.
In an effort to reduce the risks faced by the agency -- and thus the
potential for losses -- Stevens said he plans to hire a chief risk
officer by the end of the year. The agency has never had one in its 75-year-history.
Though these changes were in the works before the FHA reviewed the new
audit, he said the steps should help fatten up the FHA's loss reserves faster than projected.
The new audit shows that even without any new measures, the reserves
will rebound to the required level within two or three years largely as the result of the recovery in the housing
market, Stevens said. This calculation is based on projections of future home prices, interest rates and the volume
and credit quality of FHA's business.
Agency's Financial Health
The audit appears especially dire because it offers a snapshot of the
agency's financial standing at the depths of a severe recession, and it does not take into account the new loans
FHA will insure and the new premiums it will collect, Stevens said. The borrowers receiving recent FHA-backed loans
have, on balance, been more creditworthy than those the agency is used to catering to, he said.
And while the reserves are at a historic low, Stevens noted that they
represent only part of the money the agency maintains to cover losses on insured mortgages. The agency, on an
ongoing basis, pays for losses directly out of a second fund. The reserve fund is intended as a backup should
losses exceed forecasts. In total, these two funds had $30.4 billion as of June 30, up from $28.3 billion on Sept.
30, 2008, according to Stevens.
The FHA's financial health is in the spotlight in part because of its
key role in buoying the housing market.
The agency lost much of its
relevance during the housing boom when home prices soared and borrowers raced to aggressive subprime lenders. But
after the subprime market collapsed, borrowers flocked back to the FHA, the only option for those who lack stellar
credit or hefty down payments. Its historic role in backing loans is more crucial now than ever.
The agency does not lend money; it insures lenders against losses. It
has captured 23 percent of all new loans made so far this year, up from just 3 percent in 2006.
But the agency's sudden popularity has alarmed some lawmakers, who
regularly question whether the FHA has the resources and expertise to handle its increased workload and avert an
avalanche of new defaults.
Listen to Scott Horsley's 10/07/09 NPR report: Debate Over Homebuyer Tax Credit Heats Up. Senator
Isakson, a 30-year realtor himself, admits in the interview that bad practices in housing triggered the global
financial collapse. And now he wants to extend the tax credit and the bad practices that will surely go with
them? What's his motive for that?